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PREFACE 
he EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) has been up and running 
since 2005. It has helped the EU stay on track towards the Kyoto 
Protocol targets in 2008–12, set at -8% of greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions below 1990 levels for the EU-15 countries and with individual 
commitments for 10 of the 12 new member states. The performance of the 
ETS sector will remain crucial to the EU’s progress in meeting its current 
target of 20% emission reductions by 2020 below 1990 levels and will be 
even more so should the EU decide to raise the level of ambition further. 
Most importantly, in the roadmap for moving to a low-carbon economy by 
2050, the EU ETS is noted as one of the main tools to achieve ambitious 
targets for GHG reductions at the European level. The EU ETS has also 
proved its ability to incentivise emission reductions beyond its direct scope: 
it has linked up with three countries in the European Economic Area, and 
expanded to the aviation sector; it has also created the largest demand for 
credits from the Clean Development Mechanism and from joint 
implementation, favouring emission reductions in both third countries and 
non-ETS sectors in Europe.  
While the ETS has solved teething problems in the first two phases 
and improved its performance, it has been suggested that the ETS has 
made some positive impacts on abatement activities but not enough on 
innovation and low-carbon technology deployment at the levels required 
for the EU’s long-term goal of keeping the temperature increase below 2°C 
above pre-industrial levels. On some occasions, the scheme has also been 
subject to debate on the pricing level, especially during economic 
downturns and subsequent decreases in demands for emission allowances. 
Against this background, CEPS brought together a Task Force 
composed of representatives of industries, business, research and non-
governmental organisations who generously offered their expertise and 
time. The members were aware of different views and positions among 
themselves, but were willing to work together to share knowledge and 
understanding. While each member of the Task Force endorses the general 
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content of the report, this does not necessarily mean that all members have 
agreed on every sentence in the report, including key messages and 
recommendations. 
It has been a real pleasure and privilege to chair the CEPS Task Force 
and to engage a broad range of stakeholders in extensive and lively 
discussions with a view to providing key messages and recommendations 
to those involved in designing and operating carbon markets. The 
discussions were rich and at times intense, reflecting the diversity of views 
of the scheme’s stakeholders, but also the interest of those stakeholders in 
improving the system. During the meetings, the members had ample 
opportunity to discuss important issues with officials from the EU 
institutions, governments and international organisations, which enabled 
the Task Force to closely follow current EU policy discussions, to provide 
timely input into the process, and to derive key messages and 
recommendations. The interim results of the Task Force in the form of ten 
key messages were presented at a CEPS side-event for the Cancún climate 
change conference (COP16) in 2010, and the final results in this report were 
communicated to the Danish EU presidency.  
I believe that the Task Force has made a constructive contribution to 
the ongoing discussion on the EU ETS in the broad context of carbon 
markets. The main challenge is how the EU could use the ETS as a driver 
for the development of future carbon markets, especially by enhancing its 
price signal. This report stresses the importance of aligning any additional 
decisions on the ETS with the EU’s long-term goal to build a low-carbon 
economy.  
I would like to thank the members of the Task Force for their active 
participation in meetings and their excellent contributions to the messages 
and recommendations of this report. My most sincere thanks also go to the 
rapporteurs of the Task Force, Noriko Fujiwara and Anton Georgiev, for 
their active collaboration and involvement in all stages of the Task Force. 
 
Benoît Leguet 
Chair of the CEPS Task Force 
Managing Director, Head of Research, CDC Climat 
Member, Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
he Cancún Agreements acknowledged scientific understanding that 
deep cuts are required in global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to 
hold the increase in the global average temperature to below 2°C 
above pre-industrial levels and that Parties to the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) should take urgent action to 
meet this long-term goal. The agreements took note of quantified economy-
wide targets for emission reductions to be implemented by Annex I Parties 
and urged developed countries to increase the ambition of their economy-
wide targets for GHG emission reductions. At the 17th Conference of the 
Parties (COP17), Parties to the UNFCCC decided to consider the 
establishment of one or more market-based mechanisms to enhance the 
cost-effectiveness of and to promote mitigation actions, which should be 
built upon existing mechanisms, including those established under the 
Kyoto Protocol.  
The COP17 in Durban resulted in historic decisions that could 
improve certainty about the prospect for a comprehensive global 
agreement that will engage all parties and likely enter into force in 2020 at 
the earliest. The conference led to the launch of a negotiating process under 
a new Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced 
Action, to develop a protocol, another legal instrument or “an agreed 
outcome with legal force”1  under the UNFCCC applicable to all parties. 
The Working Group is tasked with completing it no later than 2015, to 
enable it to be adopted at COP21 in 2015, and come into effect and be 
implemented from 2020. 2  The Durban conference also agreed that the 
                                                      
1 See the Decision adopted (CP.17), “Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group 
on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action” on the UNFCCC website 
(http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/durban_nov_2011/decisions/application/pdf/
cop17_durbanplatform.pdf). 
2 Ibid. 
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second commitment period (CP2) would be set under the Kyoto Protocol3 
and it succeeded in operationalising the key elements of the Cancún 
Agreements, such as the Green Climate Fund and the technology 
mechanism. 
In an attempt to meet their collective commitments, the EU and other 
developed countries started providing fast-start finance in 2010–12, 
intended for balanced allocation between climate mitigation and 
adaptation measures in developing countries. The Green Climate Fund has 
been set up in the context of an agreement on mobilising annual financial 
flows leading up to 2020 to address the latter countries’ needs. In finding 
sources of finance, great emphasis has been placed on the potential 
engagement of the private sector in mobilising financial flows on a large 
scale to assist developing countries to combat climate change, yet the 
Parties remain short of addressing in a concrete manner how public finance 
could leverage private investments or how carbon markets could attract 
direct investments in the relevant sectors. Future flexible mechanisms, such 
as sectoral crediting, sectoral trading and the crediting of nationally 
appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) are tools that may capture 
untapped potential for mitigation in advanced developing countries and 
fill some of the gap between the level of finance required and the level of 
finance available.  
The primary function of carbon markets for compliance buyers is the 
discovery of the carbon price at which mitigation can be undertaken in the 
most cost-effective way. Carbon markets, if well designed, can discover the 
cheapest and most effective abatement path to reach a certain emission 
reduction target. The EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) seeks “to 
promote reductions of greenhouse gas emissions in a cost-effective and 
economically efficient manner” (preamble (1) of the ETS Directive 
(2009/29/EC)). 4   International offsets or credits from the Clean 
                                                      
3 The CP2 will begin on 1 January 2013 and end on either 31 December 2017 or 31 
December 2020, to be decided at the next session. See the Decision, “Outcome of 
the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I 
Parties under the Kyoto Protocol at its sixteenth session” on the UNFCCC website 
(http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/durban_nov_2011/decisions/application/pdf/
awgkp_outcome.pdf). 
4 See European Parliament and Council of the European Union (2009a). FUTURE CARBON MARKETS | v 
 
Development Mechanism (CDM) or joint implementation (JI) – both 
created through the Kyoto Protocol – can be used by compliant entities 
under the EU ETS to cover some of their emissions, thereby lowering 
overall compliance costs. While their continuation in CP2 is secured, their 
future beyond 2020 is uncertain and will depend on the level of Parties’ 
commitments on the one hand, and the development of new, national 
trading schemes and new mechanisms under the international framework 
on the other.  
The ability of the EU ETS to send a price signal that is robust enough 
to trigger long-term investments will be crucial in the implementation of 
the roadmap for moving to a low-carbon economy in 2050, if endorsed, and 
possible amendment to the 2020 emission reduction target, both of which 
presume an increasing role of domestic mitigation actions within the EU. 
Increasing scarcity, while upholding and further improving the 
predictability of rule-making, would make the EU ETS a more forceful 
driver of innovation and technology deployment for transition to a low-
carbon economy in Phase III and beyond.  
This report focuses on the purposes and potential outcomes of the EU 
ETS, and its prospects for improving the cost-effectiveness of mitigation 
actions by expanding its scope to new sectors, linking with flexible 
mechanisms and enhancing the long-term price signal. The report 
addresses carbon finance along with technology deployment and 
innovation as possible achievements that may be expected from the ETS, 
but does not look into each area further. The linking of the EU ETS to 
planned cap-and-trade schemes in other industrialised and developing 
countries is outside the scope of this report.  
Key messages 
Purposes and possible achievements of carbon markets  
The primary purpose of carbon markets is to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions in a cost-efficient way. Carbon markets can also finance 
mitigation and adaptation actions and provide support for technology 
deployment and innovation. 
1)  Carbon markets, with appropriate short- and long-term targets, are 
a reliable and cost-efficient way to meet requirements for GHG 
emission reductions.  vi | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Carbon markets could play a critical role in promoting investment in 
mitigation actions, as part of an attempt to keep the global 
temperature increase within 2°C above pre-industrial levels. Carbon 
markets have already played a role in reducing GHG emissions, and 
through a “share of proceeds” 5   of the CDM, have assisted in 
financing adaptation. At present there are two major carbon markets: 
the EU ETS and the international Kyoto Protocol markets, including 
the CDM/JI markets that are creating, respectively, certified emission 
reductions (CERs) and emission reduction units (ERUs). The EU ETS 
has so far driven demand for CERs and ERUs, far ahead of demand 
by governments or other domestic, emission trading schemes (e.g. 
New Zealand). 
The EU ETS is a cap-and-trade scheme: it results in GHG 
emission reductions compared with a business-as-usual scenario by 
setting a cap on overall emissions in the sectors covered and 
distributing emission allowances to each entity, which is then entitled 
to trade the allocated quantity. The EU ETS allows for a limited use of 
international offsets from the Kyoto Protocol markets. The 
performance of the ETS sector in mitigation is important for the EU’s 
ability to meet its current target of 20% GHG emission reductions by 
2020 compared with a 1990 baseline and will be instrumental in 
meeting any increases in the level of reductions.  
2)  Carbon markets could be an effective way of channelling and 
scaling up private investments, and facilitating public funding. 
To meet the goal of mobilising $100 billion per year by 2020, both 
public funding and private investments need to be significantly 
boosted. If the level of carbon constraint on the private sector through 
a domestic measure is not stringent enough, there will be greater 
pressure for the public funding of carbon abatement measures. And 
vice versa, if public funding is not sufficiently available on the side of 
                                                      
5  The Kyoto Protocol requires that a share of the proceeds from CDM project 
activities be used to cover administrative expenses as well as to assist developing 
country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate 
change to meet the costs of adaptation (Art. 12(8)). See “Share of Proceeds” on the 
CDM Rulebook website of Baker & McKenzie’s Global Environmental Markets 
Practice (http://cdmrulebook.org/369). FUTURE CARBON MARKETS | vii 
 
the ‘donor countries’, it is ever more important for private finance to 
be channelled towards less wealthy economies for mitigation. The 
private sector is expected to provide a considerable share of long-
term, international climate finance. Private investments are expected 
to complement public funding in scaling up the financial flows and 
investment in climate actions in developing countries.  
Yet regulations, including those for carbon markets, need clear 
policy objectives to stimulate private investments. Some of the 
auctioning revenues under the EU ETS could contribute to climate 
finance, but their disbursement will remain in the hands of EU 
member states as a consequence of the legislative agreement. Equally 
important, private investments cannot be regarded as a cure for all of 
the climate finance challenge. For example, because of a lack of 
visibility after the end of the first commitment period (CP1) of the 
Kyoto Protocol and before the entry into force of the new global 
agreement, at present there is no significant demand for international 
credits or offsets, which hinders or delays investments in low-carbon 
projects.  
The making of future carbon markets  
Future carbon markets will be expected to build on existing market-based 
mechanisms (such as the CDM and JI) plus domestic/regional trading 
schemes.  
3)  A carbon market needs to function well and work cost-effectively.  
Carbon markets have grown rapidly over the last ten years. The EU 
ETS faces opportunities and challenges in three main areas: linking to 
other market mechanisms, cap-setting and allocation, and technology 
and innovation. The scope of the EU ETS was broadened and 
enhanced with the inclusion of five countries in 2007, with domestic 
aviation as well as international aviation into and out of the EU as of 
2012, and with its acceptance of international offsets or credits subject 
to a use limit as of 2005.  
4)  Until a global agreement comes into force, the demand for 
international offsets will be determined by domestic or regional 
legislation. 
It is important to look at how the carbon market can be legally 
grounded in UN decisions or domestic legislation (or both). 
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decisions. The EU ETS was inspired by the Kyoto Protocol but is 
designed to function independently. Uncertainty in implementing 
domestic legislation would undermine the supply of offsets or credits 
and the related demand.  
5)  A comprehensive international agreement needs to be underpinned 
by flexible mechanisms and their links with regional or domestic 
schemes for emissions trading. 
Provided there is an appropriate national framework, future flexible 
mechanisms (e.g. sectoral crediting, sectoral trading and NAMA 
crediting) could offer a means to expand the coverage of GHG 
emission targets beyond individual projects and scale up financial 
flows and investments. Notably, however, the crediting undertaken 
through the REDD-plus6 programme is still considered a challenge by 
many policy-makers owing to difficulties with permanence, 
monitoring and verification. 
6)  A more coordinated approach to the treatment of offsets will 
advance the integration of carbon markets. 
In the absence of an international agreement, acceptance of the same 
commodities in international offsets could catalyse a global carbon 
market through indirect linking among different domestic schemes. 
Specific areas that require coordination include the treatment of 
international offsets or credits, e.g. CERs and ERUs.  
The ways forward for the EU ETS  
The EU ETS can potentially spur investments towards a low-carbon 
economy by enhancing the long-term price signal. 
7)  Domestic or regional legislation, or ideally a comprehensive 
international agreement, is needed to bring long-term 
predictability to carbon markets. 
                                                      
6   REDD stands for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation. REDD-plus includes the role of conservation, sustainable 
management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks. See “About 
REDD+” on the  UN-REDD Programme website ( http://www.un-
redd.org/AboutREDD/tabid/582/Default.aspx). FUTURE CARBON MARKETS | ix 
 
Regulatory uncertainty or arbitrariness is a major concern for the 
private sector. In the absence of an international agreement, domestic 
legislation addressing a cap-and-trade scheme and especially the 
long-term cap trajectory can bring some predictability to the market. 
8)  At present, the short-term volatility of the carbon price and the lack 
of a long-term price signal have limited the scale of investment. 
Market participants are aware that carbon has a long-term value 
despite short-term price volatility. The projected price on the long-
term horizon is even more important than the current price, 
especially for influencing investment decisions. The development of 
the EU ETS has started to have an impact on investment in the power 
and industry sectors. Ad hoc and short-term fixes need to be avoided 
in domestic and regional cap-and-trade schemes.  
One option to stimulate investment in mitigation activities 
would be to set a clear long-term trajectory and embed it into EU 
legislation, e.g. by defining targets for 2030, 2040 and 2050. 
Another option would be to tighten the EU-wide cap of the EU 
ETS from 2020. The European Commission could examine the 
adequacy of the cap in terms of its alignment with the long-term 
GHG emission targets endorsed by the EU, and if necessary adjust 
the cap. 
A third option to stimulate investment would be to tighten the 
ETS Phase III cap by setting aside some amount of allowances. This 
set-aside option would cause scarcity and support the carbon price 
only if market participants believe that it entails a permanent removal 
of allowances. On the other hand, this option risks falling under the 
heading of ad hoc and short-term fixes, which could undermine 
predictability and support for the scheme. 
9)  It is important to ensure the integrity and consistency of EU 
legislation that supports the EU’s climate change objectives.  
The EU ETS plays a strong role in promoting renewable energy and 
energy efficiency measures. A carbon market and an energy market 
need to be made coherent and linked with one another. There are 
overlaps and there could be competing outcomes among the rules in 
EU legislation, e.g. the proposed energy efficiency Directive and the 
EU ETS Directive. 
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Recommendations  
While international negotiations at the COP17 in Durban have set a 
timeline for developing a comprehensive global agreement, there will be a 
gap between the end of CP1 of the Kyoto Protocol in 2012 and the entry 
into force of a new global agreement (in 2020 at the earliest), during which 
many of the major emitting economies are likely to adopt emission 
reduction commitments. During this period, the EU and a few other Parties 
will have legally-binding commitments. The EU has considered a set of 
unilateral actions ranging from the roadmap towards a low-carbon 
economy in 2050 to a possible amendment of the 2020 GHG emission target 
and adjustments to the designs of the EU ETS Phase III. Against this 
background, this CEPS Task Force has formulated the following 
recommendations.  
Purposes and outcomes of carbon markets 
1)  The EU should endeavour to maintain and improve the cost-
effectiveness of the EU ETS in mitigation actions.  
2)  The European Commission and member states should launch a direct 
consultation process with the private sector on what the latter could 
contribute to climate finance, and in particular on the possible 
achievements of carbon markets in finance and investments.  
The making of future carbon markets 
3)  The EU should continue to expand carbon markets by exploring the 
inclusion of new sectors (e.g. maritime) into the ETS, providing 
incentives for new CDM projects whose credits would be eligible for 
compliance with the EU ETS Phase III, supporting the groundwork 
for such new mechanisms as sectoral crediting and domestic offsets, 
and establishing bilateral agreements with third countries.  
The early conclusion of bilateral agreements with developing 
countries is crucial in encouraging the active engagement of the 
private sector, although this is probably not sufficient to mobilise the 
levels of finance needed.  
The provision on domestic offsets requires further clarification 
for implementation and the active involvement of the private sector, 
i.e. rules to operationalise Art. 24(a) of the EU ETS Directive. FUTURE CARBON MARKETS | xi 
 
4)  In the absence of a comprehensive global agreement, carbon markets 
should be gradually expanded through continued use of existing 
tools. Examples include CERs/ERUs (Art. 11(a), ETS Directive), 
implementing bilateral agreements with third countries on crediting 
emission reduction activities (Art. 11(a)(5)) or linking with other, 
mandatory cap-and-trade schemes (Art. 25).  
5)  The EU should develop a time frame for the availability of the 
mechanism options to provide better predictability.  
6)  The EU could also move forward in implementing capacity-building 
programmes and pilot projects to examine the feasibility of sectoral 
crediting or trading.  
7)  The EU should ensure sufficient fungibility of different mechanisms. 
Fungibility in this context means that different credits issued in 
different schemes are (partially) compatible to secure sufficient 
liquidity. It would be important to ensure fungibility between the 
existing and new mechanisms, especially if the emerging mechanism 
options are designed in a bottom-up manner. Lack of coordination 
among the design elements of the respective mechanisms leads to a 
lack of fungibility between credits or allowances. The challenge 
would be to ensure fungibility as well as environmental integrity, for 
example through enhancing measurement and verification or using 
conservative defaults.  
The ways forward for the EU ETS 
8)  Additional decisions on the EU ETS contemplated by the European 
Commission or member states should not be ad hoc or piecemeal, as 
that would undermine predictability.  
9)  To increase predictability, the European Commission and member 
states should consider launching a process of consultation with 
stakeholders to minimise ad hoc approaches in favour of approaches 
that have been envisaged in the ETS Directive.  | 1 
 
INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND 
he Cancún Agreements recognise the scientific view that a global 
average temperature increase should be kept below 2°C above pre-
industrial levels. To limit the temperature increase to 2°C, the 
European Council endorsed the EU objective of reducing greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions by 80-95% below 1990 levels by 2050, as part of necessary 
reductions by developed countries according to the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (European Commission, 2011a). The EU and 
member states remain committed to GHG emission targets as agreed in the 
energy and climate change package, cutting at least 20% unilaterally and 
up to 30% if other developed countries come on board.7 
The EU accounts for around 14% of global GHG emissions and this 
share has been declining over the years. 8  Considering that emissions 
trading is a cost-effective way to reduce GHG emissions, the EU views the 
Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) as the flagship of its climate policies. The 
EU ETS is the first cross-border, large-scale system to cap and trade GHG 
emissions from over 11,500 installations in the European power and 
industry sectors,9 joined by aviation in 2012. A number of studies provide 
evidence that the EU ETS has led to a significant amount of GHG emission 
reductions in each of the first three years in Phase I (2005–07), based on an 
observed emissions-intensity improvement above historical trends. CEPS’ 
own calculations, which extend these estimates to 2008 and 2009, show 
even greater intensity improvements in Phase II than those realised in 
Phase I (Egenhofer et al., 2011). Other studies reviewed by CEPS present 
evidence of abatement based on case study analysis and interviews, and 
                                                      
7 See Decision 1/CP.16, “The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad 
Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention” in 
UNFCCC (2011a).  
8 D. Meadows, presentation at the CEPS Task Force meeting on 15 September 2010.  
9 Ibid. 
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suggest that investment has taken place in energy efficiency and in large-
scale coal power generation, i.e. where the payback is fast or carbon-
intensity is high, which may point to the importance of longer-term price 
expectations (Egenhofer et al., 2011).  
Today carbon markets mainly consist of the EU ETS and the Kyoto 
Protocol market.10 The EU ETS is at present the core of the ‘global carbon 
market’. According to an annual World Bank report on carbon markets, the 
growth of carbon markets has been driven by the EU ETS as the dominant 
source of demand for certified emission reductions (CERs): the share of EU 
allowances (EUAs) accounted for 84% of the value of the global carbon 
market in 2010 (Linacre et al., 2011). The so-called ‘Linking Directive’ 
(2004/101/EC) allows the ETS-covered installations to use credits from the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and joint implementation (JI) for 
compliance purposes. In addition, EU member states have purchased CERs 
to meet their respective Kyoto Protocol targets. Access to credits or offsets 
may not only maximise the economic efficiency of carbon markets but also 
provide price stability over a period of time.  
Established under the Kyoto Protocol (Art. 12), the CDM assists 
Annex I Parties in achieving compliance with their emission reduction 
commitments. In the long-term all countries, including advanced 
developing countries, need to take greater action to reduce GHG emissions. 
In parallel with UN negotiations, several of the advanced developing 
countries, such as China and India, have stepped up concrete plans and 
measures for mitigation actions (e.g. five-year plans and domestic schemes 
for emissions trading). 
The Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) have been discussing the creation of new market-based 
mechanisms (e.g. sectoral crediting, sectoral trading, the crediting of 
                                                      
10   The Kyoto Protocol envisages three “market-based mechanisms”: joint 
implementation (Art. 6), the Clean Development Mechanism (Art. 12) and 
international emissions trading (Art. 17). The term “flexible mechanism” is also 
widely used to indicate these mechanisms and has been used in this report. See 
“The Mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol: Emissions Trading, the Clean 
Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation” on the UNFCCC 
website (http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/items/1673.php). FUTURE CARBON MARKETS | 3 
 
nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) or the REDD11 plus12 
programme; see also section 3.2.3) as well as an extension of the existing 
project mechanisms (e.g. the CDM). It will take some time to put new 
mechanisms in place and develop the monitoring capacity as well as the 
institutional/administrative structure.  
The biggest challenge at present, however, is the delay in reaching a 
global agreement that assigns ambitious targets to major emitting countries 
and quantifies the demand in the carbon market. While the Parties agreed 
on setting the second commitment period (CP2) of the Kyoto Protocol, 
demand for CERs will be limited to those that decided to take on binding 
commitments for quantitative emission reductions, i.e. the EU and 
countries of the European Economic Area. There will be a gap between the 
end of the first commitment period (CP1) of the Kyoto Protocol in 2012 and 
the entry into force of a new global agreement (in 2020 at the earliest) in 
which many of the major emitting economies are likely to adopt emission 
reduction commitments. 
With remaining uncertainty about the level of real ambition and the 
legal form of a forthcoming multilateral framework for climate change, 
along with the likelihood of needing to bridge an extended period of low 
demand, some Annex I Parties have strengthened domestic measures or 
started developing bilateral mechanisms. Among the political challenges 
are whether Parties will scale up national or bilateral mitigation actions 
ahead of the forthcoming multilateral framework to be established by the 
UN or whether they can consider any alternative multilateral route for a 
transition period.  
There is a strong role for the EU in today’s fragmented carbon market, 
which is made up of different mechanisms setting different prices for 
carbon. Future flexible mechanisms are likely to be established for diverse 
purposes and for the varying capacities of host countries. One size does not 
fit all. These separate markets can be linked through common commodities 
                                                      
11 REDD refers to Reducing Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing 
Countries.  
12 REDD-plus includes the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests 
and enhancement of forest carbon stocks; see “About REDD+” on the UN-REDD 
Programme website (http://www.un-redd.org/AboutREDD/tabid/582/ 
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if not through common mechanism designs. In this scenario, it is crucial to 
ensure the environmental integrity of the overall system by monitoring and 
tracking the generation and movement of commodities.  
This report is structured as follows. Chapter 1 identifies the purposes 
and possible achievements of carbon markets. Chapter 2 focuses on the 
balance between demand and supply in the EU ETS. Chapter 3 explores 
ways to facilitate transition from the CDM to new market-based 
mechanisms, highlighting the potential of sectoral approaches in key 
emitting sectors. Chapter 4 discusses recent EU initiatives to move towards 
future flexible mechanisms and expand the ETS sector. Chapter 5 looks at 
ways to improve the predictability associated with a carbon price in the EU 
ETS. The report closes the discussion with concluding remarks. It is written 
in non-technical language for a wide range of stakeholders. 
This report addresses carbon finance along with technology 
deployment and innovation as potential achievements that may be 
expected from the ETS but does not look into each area further. The report 
mainly envisages the possibility for the ETS to be primarily linked with 
flexible mechanisms rather than with other mandatory cap-and-trade 
schemes as originally foreseen in Art. 25 of the ETS Directive (2009/29/EC). 
Examples of planned cap-and-trade schemes in other industrialised and 
developing countries are outside the scope of this report.  | 5 
 
1.  PURPOSES AND POSSIBLE 
ACHIEVEMENTS OF CARBON MARKETS 
he primary purpose of carbon markets for compliance buyers is to 
discover the carbon price at which mitigation can take place in a 
more cost-efficient way. Carbon markets may also lead to 
achievements in financing climate actions and in supporting technology 
deployment and innovation for transition to a low-carbon economy. This 
chapter discusses how carbon markets could contribute to cost-effective 
mitigation in the context of the EU ETS and also lead to positive 
achievements in i) channelling private investments as well as public 
funding to developing countries and EU member states for climate actions, 
and ii) driving clean-technology deployment and innovation. 
1.1  Carbon markets as a cost-effective mitigation tool 
The ETS is considered the most cost-effective and flexible tool for 
mitigation, giving rise to greater reduction potential. The EU ETS has 
already resulted in GHG emission reductions under a cap: CEPS’ own 
calculations seem to confirm what has already been found in relation to 
Phase I, that the ETS led to abatement in the period 2006–09 (Convery et al., 
2010), as measured in a CO2 emissions-intensity improvement (Egenhofer 
et al., 2011). Significant regulatory changes for Phase III aimed at enhancing 
the stability of rules will start to pay off. These changes include a longer 
trading period, early cap-setting and in principle a move towards full 
auctioning in the electricity sector and more gradually in industry sectors.13 
Carbon markets can reduce compliance costs for the EU in meeting its 
current target of a 20% cut in GHG emissions from 1990 levels by 2020 and 
                                                      
13  Limited auctioning has been implemented in the electricity and industrial 
sectors, i.e. at least 5% in Phase I and 10% in Phase II. In aviation, the share of 
auctioning is 15% for 2012–20. 
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any greater level of reductions. To date, the European Commission has 
considered options for moving beyond 20% up to 30% in the target for 
GHG emission reductions leading up to 2020 (European Commission, 
2010a). It has assessed the risk of carbon leakage at the EU level (European 
Commission, 2010a and 2010b) and the costs and benefits at the member 
state level (European Commission, 2012). The Commission has put forward 
an assessment that a 30% target can be achieved cost-effectively, given the 
full implementation of the Energy Efficiency Action Plan and access to 
offset credits (European Commission, 2011a; see also European 
Commission, 2012).  
Under the current 20% target, the ETS sector (originally electricity 
and industry, joined by aviation in 2012) must achieve a 21% cut below 
2005–07 levels by 2020 while the non-ETS sectors must yield a 14% cut 
below 2005 levels. Recent modelling results (PRIMES and GAINS) suggest 
that a 25% GHG domestic-reduction scenario would lead to 26% of 
domestic reductions in ETS sectors compared with 2005 (European 
Commission, 2012).  
1.2  Carbon markets as financing instruments to assist 
developing countries as well as EU member states 
1.2.1  Developing countries 
Carbon markets are expected to play an important role in scaling up 
climate finance. A robust carbon market could be an important source of 
long-term finance to assist mitigation and adaptation actions in developing 
countries. The questions are how markets can be used to generate finance 
and how much can be expected. Much of the amount of long-term finance 
pledged collectively by developed countries, $100 billion (annually by 
2020),14  is meant to be leveraged inter alia through carbon markets, but 
what this means in practice is unclear.  
  
                                                      
14 See Decision 1/CP.16, “The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad 
Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention” in 
UNFCCC (2011a). FUTURE CARBON MARKETS | 7 
 
The expected contribution of carbon markets to climate finance 
requires ambitious actions in developed countries and a shift from the 
traditional CDM to a programme of activities (PoAs)15  and/or to such 
future flexible mechanisms as sectoral crediting or trading mechanisms in 
advanced developing countries and their key emitting sectors (see section 
3.2). The estimated investment in registered projects that have requested 
issuance or have CERs issued amounted to over $81 billion by mid-2011, of 
which $63 billion was invested in China (UNFCCC, 2011c). The current 
CDM does not appear to be capable of generating sufficient or bigger 
financial flows in order to reach the goal of $100 billion per year. Future 
flexible mechanisms could be used to fund part of the required amount. 
Other innovative sources include the issuance of bonds earmarked to 
finance climate actions in developing countries (e.g. green funds and 
bonds, NAMA bonds) and a levy on emissions from international aviation 
and maritime.16 Green NAMA bonds could leverage public finance for low-
carbon policies and investments in developing countries and create 
credible private financing, for instance involving a host developing 
country, project investors, international financial institutions17 or individual 
Annex 1 countries for guarantee, and an international green bond board.18 
  
                                                      
15  A PoA is a voluntary action coordinated by a public or private entity to 
implement a policy, measure or stated goal, which leads to GHG emission 
reductions or removals that are additional. See “What is a Programme of 
Activities”, on the CDM Rulebook website of Baker & McKenzie’s Global 
Environmental Markets Practice (http://cdmrulebook.org/452). 
16 The Task Force did not particularly focus on the proposed levy on emissions 
from international aviation and maritime. For details about this proposal, see 
European Commission (2010c) or IMF (2011).  
17 For example, the World Bank has been issuing Green Bonds. See “World Bank 
Green Bonds” on the World Bank Treasury website 
(http://treasury.worldbank.org/cmd/htm/WorldBankGreenBonds.html). 
18 H. Derwent, “How to make new tools work in the carbon market”, presentation 
at the CEPS Task Force meeting on 15 September 2010 
(http://www.ceps.eu/files/HenryDerwentCEPSSept2010.pdf). 8 | PURPOSES AND POSSIBLE ACHIEVEMENTS OF CARBON MARKETS 
 
In addition, there will likely be an international mechanism 
rewarding avoided deforestation and forest degradation: REDD-plus (see 
section 3.2.3). There are three types of finance needs in REDD-plus: 
capacity building/readiness, upfront investment and compensation for 
emission reductions (O’Sullivan et al., 2010). 19  Financing  REDD-plus 
requires some progress in addressing potential donors’ concerns about 
carbon leakage as well as the measurement, reporting and verification 
(MRV) of reductions. The engagement of the private sector in REDD-plus 
will involve risks and opportunities. There are four kinds of risks: 
international policy risk in REDD-plus, eligibility risk in REDD-plus, 
government implementation risk and market risk. Tools to reduce various 
risks include guarantees by state or development banks, private insurance, 
securitisation and rain forest bonds (O’Sullivan et al., 2010).20 
1.2.2  EU member states 
Potential revenues from the sale of surplus AAUs (assigned amount units) 
are currently limited to CP1 and are very insecure, depending on the price 
agreed in bilateral deals. If an EU member state is primarily motivated to 
sell AAUs for additional revenues, one proposal under consideration is to 
enable the EU’s cohesion fund to support spending programmes that were 
initially dependent on the sale of AAUs and can be extended beyond 2012. 
Such a proposal could be negotiated as part of the next phase of the EU 
budget for 2014–20. The proposed total budget for the cohesion fund for 
2014–20 is €68.7 billion, to support projects in member states with a per-
capita gross national income of less than 90% of the EU average (European 
Commission, 2012). 
The replacement of surplus AAUs by the cohesion fund as a source of 
funding for climate change programmes would mean exchanging virtual 
revenues with secure and viable EU funding. Those revenues are virtual as 
well as insecure in the sense that CP2 AAUs are not yet agreed and even 
CP1 AAUs can only be monetised when a seller reaches a deal with a 
potential buyer on the price. The option of replacing surplus AAUs with 
the cohesion fund could result in more emission reductions at lower costs 
                                                      
19  See also M. von Unger, presentation at the CEPS Task Force meeting on 15 
September 2010 (http://www.ceps.eu/files/vonUngerREDD.pdf). 
20 Ibid. FUTURE CARBON MARKETS | 9 
 
in new member states, thereby supporting a move beyond a 20% cut in 
GHG emissions. There is an open question, however, about the absorptive 
capacity of recipient member states. 
For these member states the replacement of surplus AAUs by 
improved access to the cohesion fund comes on top of auctioning revenues, 
including those resulting from the redistribution of auctioning rights in the 
ETS Phase III to take into account variance in income per capita and growth 
prospects. Moreover, depending on the design, the proposal for setting 
aside a portion of allowances to be auctioned could have further 
distributional impacts on member states’ auctioning revenues in favour of 
low-income countries. The European Commission’s analysis estimates that 
the transfer resulting from the redistribution of auctioning rights to the 
lower-income member states would increase by €5.4 billion in 2020 without 
reducing the net value of the revenues of higher-income member states 
(European Commission, 2012). A higher carbon price expected from a set-
aside would result in higher revenues. 
Lastly, while the decision on how to use revenues from the sale of 
AAUs depends on a host country’s discretion or its contractual obligations 
with buyers, the decision on how to spend auctioning revenues is 
conditioned by EU law. Under Art. 10(3) of the ETS Directive (European 
Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2009a), member states can 
determine the use of revenues from the auctioning of allowances and are 
expected to earmark at least 50% of the revenues for policies or measures 
focusing on GHG emission reductions, renewable energy sources, avoiding 
deforestation, assistance to developing countries or other purposes for 
climate change.  
1.3  Carbon markets as a driver of innovation and technology 
deployment for transition to a low-carbon economy in the EU 
A significant scale of decarbonisation is required to achieve an 80% 
reduction in overall European CO2 emissions from 1990 levels by 2050 – 
from 4.0 Gt to 0.8 Gt. 21   By sector, power generation 22  needs  to  be 
                                                      
21  AREVA, presentation at the CEPS Task Force meeting on 27 October 2010, 
sourced from IEA-WEO (2009), Bain hypotheses. 
22 Power generation refers to electricity plants, heat plants and combined heat and 
power plants. Ibid. 10 | PURPOSES AND POSSIBLE ACHIEVEMENTS OF CARBON MARKETS 
 
decarbonised by 90% to meet the 80% overall target, and the transportation, 
building and heating industries will need to be electrified.23  
Looking ahead towards 2030 and then 2050, renewables will 
represent a larger share of the EU-27 electricity mix: 16% in 2007, 44% in 
2030 in the IEA 450 ppm Scenario and 55% in 2050 in the OECD/IEA Blue 
Map.24  Currently, some low-carbon technologies – such as photovoltaic 
cells and carbon capture and storage – are available but have not achieved 
an economy of scale.  
Decarbonisation of the electricity sector requires a shift to a capital-
intensive mix, adding to the investment challenge. Technologies for low-
carbon power generation are significantly more capital-intensive. EU 
decarbonisation objectives will trigger significant capital expenditures in 
the coming years. There is a 30% gap between the level of investment 
required and the investment capabilities of EU utilities by 2020: €938 billion 
is required and €653 billion is available.25 
The carbon market alone would not be able to make technologies for 
low-carbon power generation commercially available within a given time 
frame. To date, although some studies have found results of some 
abatement in Phase I, there is little empirical evidence that the EU ETS has 
had an impact on stimulating innovation and technology deployment, 
possibly owing to the short time span in which the EU ETS has been 
operating so far. 
CO2 prices remain largely uncertain until 2020 and beyond, leading to 
wide variance in price projections and causing difficulties in the investment 
environment. Forecasts for the demand and supply balance until 2020, 
which determines the carbon price, are compared in the next chapter. 
To provide an incentive for a move beyond 20% in GHG emission 
reductions, the EU has designed several tools to finance early investment in 
low-carbon technologies, for example encouraging member states to use a 
share of auctioning revenues (Art. 10(b), ETS Directive) and the new 
 
                                                      
23 Transportation only includes fuel combustion, not fuel production. Ibid. 
24 Ibid., sourced from IEA (2010). 
25 Ibid., sourced from Citi Investment Research and Analysis, and KPMG, Powering 
ahead: 2010 – An outlook for renewable energy M&A, KPMG, London, 2010. FUTURE CARBON MARKETS | 11 
 
entrant reserve (Art. 10(a)(8), ETS Directive). On the other hand, critics 
argue that regulators should not pick winners but leave the market to 
decide; this argument applies to various measures, such as reserves of 
allowances in domestic cap-and-trade schemes (as noted above) and in the 
CDM and other financing mechanisms.  12 | 
 
2.  THE BALANCE BETWEEN DEMAND AND 
SUPPLY IN THE EU ETS 
t present there are two major carbon markets: the EU ETS (see 
“Introduction & background” in this report for its share) and the 
international market set-up under the Kyoto Protocol, including 
the markets for CERs and emissions reduction units (ERUs). There are 
other markets, such as voluntary ones, whose share remains small. Several 
carbon markets set several prices.  
Given the current co-existence of multiple markets, a global carbon 
market could be built up through the indirect linking of existing carbon 
markets among commodities. Linking could increase liquidity, reduce 
volatility and provide opportunities for low-cost abatement. In the current 
fragmented markets, there are two possibilities for the way forward. In 
national or regional carbon markets with different carbon prices (e.g. 
domestic cap-and-trade schemes), the main questions are i) why a single 
carbon price has not emerged and ii) how the establishment of a carbon 
price can be facilitated. In market pockets – albeit not deep – with a global 
carbon price (e.g. CER), a limit in the scope of activities to the level of 
projects leads to a limit in economic efficiency (Armand, 2011). There are 
other factors that might have impeded the development of the Kyoto 
Protocol market, including the lack of visibility about subsequent 
commitment periods.  
Based on the above understanding, this chapter examines the 
performance of carbon markets in terms of the demand and supply balance 
in the EU ETS in 2012–20. There are two supply issues: uncertainty about 
the future treatment of surplus AAUs and associated ERUs, and the 
oversupply of EU emission allowances (EUAs). 
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2.1  Surplus AAUs and associated ERUs 
An annual World Bank report on the carbon market anticipated that up to 
2012 buyers would be able to meet their demands mainly through the 
cumulative supply of carbon credits generated under the flexible 
mechanisms (e.g. CERs and ERUs) as well as AAUs (Linacre et al., 2011). 
Entering into the last year of CP1 of the Kyoto Protocol and foreseeing the 
EU’s qualitative restrictions on CDM/JI project types due to start from 2013 
(see chapter 4), the issuance of CERs increased in 2011 and will continue to 
do so throughout 2012 (see Figure 1). In addition, Russia and Ukraine 
finally started issuing a significant amount of ERUs in 2011.26 
Surplus AAUs are available in both new member states and third 
countries like Russia and Ukraine, currently dominant suppliers. 27 
Although the EU ETS Directive does not directly accept AAUs, there is a 
risk of indirectly importing AAUs in the form of ERUs, especially those 
originating in JI Track 1.28 Under JI, ERUs are converted from AAUs.  
In Durban, although the Parties agreed to continue the Kyoto 
Protocol with subsequent commitment periods, they considered the extent 
to which Parties would be allowed to carry surplus CP1 AAUs over into 
                                                      
26 For Russia, on the Russian Registry of Carbon Units website, compare the data 
reports on “Holding and transaction information on the Russian registry of carbon 
units” of 31 December 2010 (http://www.carbonunitsregistry.ru/reports/ENG-
transactions_31_12_2010.pdf), 31 December 2011 (http://www.carbonunitsregistry. 
ru/reports/ENG-transactions_31_12_2011.pdf), and 7 February 2012 
(http://www.carbonunitsregistry.ru/reports/ENG-transactions.pdf). For Ukraine, 
on the Ukrainian Registry of Carbon Units website, compare the data reported in 
these two datasets: “Holding and Transaction Information on the National 
Electronic Registry of Anthropogenic Emissions and Absorbtion of Greenhouse 
Gases of Ukraine 31.12.2010” (http://www.carbonunitsregistry.gov.ua/en/ 
publication/content/855.htm) and “Holding and Transaction Information on the 
National Electronic Registry of Anthropogenic Emissions and Absorbtion of 
Greenhouse Gases of Ukraine 31.12.2011” (http://www.carbonunitsregistry. 
gov.ua/en/publication/content/978.htm). 
27 Ibid. As for other Annex 1 countries, see the national registry websites available 
at “Registry Websites” on the UNFCCC website (http://unfccc.int/ 
kyoto_protocol/registry_systems/registry_websites/items/4067.php). 
28 Track 1 is supervised by the UNFCCC only at a macro level: the Parties must 
meet the eligibility criteria to participate in JI Track 1. 14 | THE BALANCE BETWEEN DEMAND AND SUPPLY IN THE EU ETS 
 
CP2.29  Within the EU, during CP2 some member states will likely have 
surplus CP1 AAUs as well as CP2 AAUs, while others will likely have a 
shortage. 
Figure 1. Accumulated issuance of CERs over time  
 
Source: “CERs”, UNEP RISOE Centre website (http://cdmpipeline.org/cers.htm). 
2.2  The balance between demand and supply in 2012–20 
The roadmap for moving to a low-carbon economy in 2050 assumes that 
the target of a 20% GHG emissions reduction can be met domestically, i.e. 
without access to international offsets, by 2020 and that a 25% cut can be 
achieved by full and effective implementation of the Energy Efficiency 
Action Plan, therein meeting the 20% energy efficiency target (European 
Commission, 2011a). According to the roadmap, only under the 30% 
scenario would there be additional demand for credits or offsets to be 
                                                      
29 See “Options for addressing the surplus and carry-over of Kyoto units for the 
second and subsequent commitment periods of the Kyoto Protocol”, presentation 
at the AWG-KP 6th session, 4th part, Durban, 6 December 2011, available on the 
UNFCCC website (http://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg-kp/application/pdf/ 
awgkp_16.4_chapter_1.pdf). FUTURE CARBON MARKETS | 15 
 
generated in non-Annex 1 countries in 2012–20. It is unclear, however, 
whether the offset or credit limit will be raised in proportion to the higher 
level of the EU’s ambition in GHG emission reductions.  
Two independent analyses and the European Commission’s 
assessment lead to a similar conclusion on the balance between demand 
and supply in the EU ETS. Table 1 shows an EUA surplus of 566 million 
tonnes with no need for any abatement at all over Phase III of the ETS, 
according to Deutsche Bank forecasts, assuming an outright contraction in 
eurozone GDP in 2012. These forecasts do not expect that there will be a 
deficit at any time beyond 2012 either (Curien and Lewis, 2011). This is 
because the EUA surplus of 566 million tonnes leading up to 2020 would 
absorb the demand for years to come and the forecasts expect the 
continuing roll-out of renewable energy capacity and energy efficiency 
measures beyond 2020, despite the annual decline of the ETS cap at a linear 
rate of 1.74% from 2020 onwards (Curien and Lewis, 2011). 
Table 1.  Base-case scenario for the ETS residual abatement requirement,  
2011-20 (Mt) 
 Estimate 
Total EUA cap over 2008–20  25,093 
Total ETS emissions over 2008–20  25,747 
Total EUA deficit over 2008–20  -655 
Aviation net EUA demand  -390 
ETS use of CERs/ERUs  1,610 
Net EUA surplus  +566 
Implied, annual, residual abatement requirement  +57* 
* This calculation is the implied, annual residual abatement required over 2011–20. 
The residual abatement requirement refers to a net EUA deficit. 
Source: Deutsche Bank (as of 29 November 2011), adapted from Figure 7, “Revised 
DB base-case scenario for ETS residual abatement requirement, 2011-20 
(Mt)” as cited in Curien and Lewis (2011).  
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Figure 2 shows a Point Carbon projection that under the current 20% 
target, in Phases II and III (2008–20) of the ETS, the supply of allowances 
will likely exceed demand resulting in oversupply of about 1.3 Gt of EUA. 
Nevertheless, Point Carbon holds that at least two factors will prevent 
prices from going to zero: a “risk” of moving beyond 20% and the 
expectation of a future shortage beyond 2020, i.e. the annual decline of the 
ETS cap at the rate of 1.74% will continue forever.30 
Figure 2. EU ETS balance (2008-20) 
 
Source: Point Carbon (as of 13 January 2012), as cited in Schjølset (2012, p. 2). 
Figure 3 illustrates another Point Carbon projection for annual and 
cumulative balances of the period the ETS in 2008–25. Even after the annual 
balance grows short in 2018, it is projected that in terms of the cumulative 
balance, the supply of allowances will likely exceed demand until 2020.31 
   
                                                      
30 See Schjølset (2012), p. 2. 
31 Ibid., p. 6. FUTURE CARBON MARKETS | 17 
 
Figure 3. Annual balances 
 
Source: Point Carbon (as of 13 January 2012), as cited in Schjølset (2012, p. 6). 
Lastly, the European Commission estimates (as of the end of January 
2012) that a large surplus of banked allowances and unused, international 
emission-reduction credits in the ETS is now equivalent to 2.4 billion in 
allowances by 2020 (European Commission, 2012). The analysis notes the 
effect of this surplus on the EUA price for years to come, even considering 
the partial recovery in industrial production in 2010–11 and further 
projected economic growth leading up to 2020. 
In conclusion, despite some variance in assumptions, the timing of 
the assessments and the resulting figures, all three recent analyses conclude 
that under the current 20% target the supply of allowances in the ETS will 
likely exceed demand until 2020 and there will effectively be no need for 
further abatement in the EU to achieve this target.  18 | 
 
3.  FUTURE OPTIONS FOR FLEXIBLE 
MECHANISMS 
he Kyoto Protocol set the basis for a global carbon market by 
establishing three flexible mechanisms: the CDM, joint 
implementation and emissions trading. There are a number of 
lessons learned from experiences with existing flexible mechanisms, 
especially the CDM (Fujiwara, 2009). These experiences led to a set of 
concrete recommendations for improvement in its operation, governance, 
accreditation, baseline and monitoring methodologies, additionality, 
standardised baselines, the registration of project activities, the issuance of 
CERs, the distribution of project activities and capacity-building.32  
Future flexible mechanisms currently under discussion, e.g. sectoral 
crediting, sectoral trading and NAMA crediting, could help to move 
towards enhanced global mitigation by requiring environmentally-
ambitious baselines and expanding the coverage of activities from projects 
to key emitting sectors. This chapter gives an overview of the discussions 
underway on transition to new market-based mechanisms, followed by an 
analysis of the key design issues in sectoral approaches to market 
mechanisms, with reference to the electricity, industry and forestry sectors. 
                                                      
32 See the most recent decision taken in Durban on "Further guidance relating to 
the clean development mechanism" (not yet formally published but available 
online at http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/durban_nov_2011/decisions/ 
application/pdf/cmp7_cdmguidance.pdf). See also Decision 3/CMP.6, “Further 
guidance relating to the clean development mechanism” (UNFCCC, 2011b) and 
Decision 2/CMP.5, taken in 2010, on “Further guidance relating to the clean 
development mechanism” http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cmp6/eng/ 
12a02.pdf).  
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3.1  A transition to new market-based mechanisms 
Parties to the UNFCCC have elaborated new options for market-based 
mechanisms, highlighting their views about the potential role these options 
might play in a comprehensive international agreement, the institutional 
set-up and the relationship between the options to the existing 
mechanisms. The likelihood of the new tools working in carbon markets 
requires trust in the UNFCCC’s ability to produce new private-finance 
mechanisms and the political acceptability of the reduced guarantees of 
environmental integrity entailed by scaling up finance.33  Then, a set of 
factors should be taken into account: demand for product(s), capacity on 
the supply side, potential borrowers, actions that will have an impact on 
the expected return, relevant public support and regulations, the process 
determining when and how to get paid for emissions reductions, risk-
bearers, transaction costs and timing constraints, and alternative 
investments that are currently available.34  
3.2  Designing new tools: Sectoral approaches 
3.2.1  Conceptual/methodological issues 
There are currently three possible scenarios of sectoral approaches to 
market mechanisms being discussed (IETA, 2011). The first scenario is 
centralised coordination of mitigation and crediting, in which a sectoral 
coordinating body reports emissions to an international credit-issuing 
agency and receives international credits for distribution or sale from the 
agency. The body sets a creditable emissions reduction objective (a target) 
below the baseline (a baseline has to be established). The second scenario is 
a domestic, sectoral trading system. A government reports emissions to an 
international credit-issuing agency and receives international credits for 
distribution or sale from the agency. The government sets an emissions cap 
below the baseline that has been established. The third scenario is 
installation-level mitigation and crediting. An international agency issues 
credits directly to the installations covered.  
                                                      
33 H. Derwent, presentation at a meeting of the CEPS Task Force, 15 September 
2010 (http://www.ceps.eu/files/HenryDerwentCEPSSept2010.pdf). 
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There will be variations in the designs of sectoral approaches, based 
on the following parameters: the sector suitable for crediting, the kind of 
target (absolute, intensity or non-GHG parameters), the kind of mechanism 
(crediting or trading) and the legal nature of the targets (binding or non-
binding, commonly known as ‘no-lose’ targets).  
Possible candidates for the sectoral coverage are large sectors with 
relatively few sources: electricity generation, heavy industry (e.g. cement, 
steel, aluminium) and forestry (i.e. REDD-plus), which should be 
measurable, reportable and verifiable. Boundary-setting for a sector or sub-
sector is an important first step.   
3.2.2  The potential of sectoral crediting: Examples of the electricity 
and cement sectors 
A sectoral crediting mechanism rewards emissions reductions from a 
covered sector against a threshold below the business-as-usual scenario (to 
be defined) (see e.g. Fujiwara, 2009). Sectoral crediting can be regarded as a 
scaled-up option mainly targeted at advanced developing countries and a 
stepping-stone from the current CDM to the ultimate goal of establishing 
cap-and-trade schemes with tight caps. Key questions include how to 
motivate the private sector to engage in sectoral crediting, how to set the 
baseline and the threshold, and how to monitor. There is no guarantee that 
one producer or investor will receive its share of credits for abatement 
achieved beyond the agreed baseline, as another producer or investor can 
undermine the sector’s overall performance. This requires a domestic 
policy framework to enable them to beat the sectoral baseline. Potential 
revenue from the sale of credits can be used to reward extra abatement 
efforts.  
The electricity sector can be regarded as a promising candidate for 
sectoral crediting. The International Energy Agency (IEA) has studied the 
potential of the Chinese electricity sector for sectoral crediting.35 It is not 
clear how the country’s pledges to GHG emissions reductions will be 
translated into a baseline for the electricity sector. One challenge is to work 
out how a CO2 price or a CO2 revenue stream could affect investment 
choices. At present, end-users pay extra costs for low-carbon energy 
                                                      
35 R. Baron, presentation at a meeting of the CEPS Task Force, 15 September 2010 
(http://www.ceps.eu/files/BaronCEPSSept2010.pdf). FUTURE CARBON MARKETS | 21 
 
sources (e.g. renewable, nuclear and hydro) through grid rates. Coal-based 
prices are benchmarked and vary according to a local development stage.36  
The cement sector has been at the vanguard of transnational efforts 
on data collection and management through the Getting the Numbers 
Right project of the Cement Sustainability Initiative (CSI) of the World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD).37  The share of 
developed countries in world cement production is declining, currently 
accounting for less than 10%, while the share of developing countries is 
rapidly increasing. The impact of the latter on global GHG emissions is also 
increasing, given that these countries do not have carbon constraints 
comparable to the EU ETS caps.38 Carbon leakage will appear without a 
global price, for example driven by an intensity target, in the long term. 
Another issue associated with sectoral crediting is that someone has to pay 
for emissions reductions in developing countries. In theory, European 
producers would not pay for competitors but pass through the costs to 
consumers. Then it is not necessarily producers but taxpayers or customers 
who will have to pay. In practice, however, certain producers – especially 
those operating in sectors or products exposed to global competition – 
might not be able to pass through all or some of the costs. 
3.2.3  REDD-plus crediting 
Clear designs of future flexible mechanisms, including a financing 
mechanism for REDD-plus, are needed to enhance the investment climate 
and limit various risks. Designs for the REDD-plus market lead to two 
market options with some variations (O’Sullivan et al., 2010).39 The  first 
option assumes only sovereign participation in the international REDD-
plus market. Environmental integrity is ensured through national reference 
levels and national-level MRV. Domestic implementation is de-linked from 
                                                      
36 Ibid. 
37 See “Global Cement Database on CO2 and Energy Information” on the website of 
the WBCSD Cement Sustainability Initiative (http://www.wbcsdcement.org/ 
index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=57&Itemid=118).  
38 R. van der Meer, comments at the CEPS Task Force meeting on 15 September 
2010.   
39 See also M. von Unger, presentation at a meeting of the CEPS Task Force, 15 
September 2010 (http://www.ceps.eu/files/vonUngerREDD.pdf). 22 | FUTURE OPTIONS FOR FLEXIBLE MECHANISMS 
 
international carbon markets and controlled by the national government. 
The second option presumes the international issuance of national credits 
with two variations, depending on whether sub-national credits are issued 
at the international or national level. These variations are comparable to the 
CDM approach (international issuance) and the JI approach (national 
issuance).   | 23 
 
4.  EU INITIATIVES: MOVING BEYOND 
THE CDM AND EXPANDING THE ETS 
SECTOR 
nsofar as international negotiations have become an open-ended 
process, the EU has two alternative pathways: to set its own rules on 
both the demand and supply sides or to work within the UN or in other 
ways internationally to find an agreement. In the former case, the ETS 
Directive (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2009a) 
allows quantitative and qualitative restrictions on access to CERs and ERUs 
in Art. 11(a), the generation of new offsets or credits generated in least 
developed countries (LDCs) in Art. 11(a)(4), bilateral agreements with 
developing countries in Art. 11(a)(5) and domestic offset schemes in Art. 
24(a). This chapter looks at each condition under which installations in the 
ETS sector could benefit from the continuous use of existing and new 
market-based mechanisms.  
4.1  Restrictions on the CDM and JI 
More restrictive rules on the recognition of CERs and ERUs in the ETS 
could limit the supply, which could possibly (under certain conditions) 
accelerate a transition towards future flexible mechanisms, such as a 
sectoral crediting mechanism.  
Art. 11(a) of the ETS Directive (European Parliament and Council of 
the European Union, 2009a) sets out quantitative restrictions that vary from 
one member state to another but should not be less than 11% of the verified 
emission reductions in 2008–12. Use of CERs and ERUs will be extended 
from 2013 to 2020, to the extent that individual quotas were not used up 
during the period 2008–12. Qualitative restrictions mean that credits from 
certain kinds of projects cannot be used for compliance purposes as of the 
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date of restriction, which can come between six months to three years after 
the entry into force of a proposal by the Commission.40  
The EU ETS will accept credits issued in 2008–12, credits issued in 
2013 or later from projects (or PoAs) registered in 2008–12 and credits from 
new projects in LDCs from 2013. Credits from specific kinds of projects 
may be subject to restrictions in the ETS from 1 January 2013 (Art. 11(a)(9), 
ETS Directive). Under the effort-sharing decision, EU member states will 
also be allowed to use credits, with imports capped at 3% of 2005 
emissions. 
As a first step, the EU approved the regulation banning CERs and 
ERUs generated from industrial gases (hydrofluorocarbons or HFCs) and 
nitrous oxide (N2O) adipic acid in projects, starting from 1 January 2013 
(European Commission, 2011c).41  There are two main reasons for which 
qualitative restrictions on the acceptance of CERs and ERUs have been 
introduced in the recent regulation.  
First, the costs of production incurred in some projects are so low that 
it brings economic rents to project developers. The low production cost 
itself should not be an issue in the market where the price is to be 
determined by the balance of demand and supply. The current pricing of 
offset credits does not necessarily reflect the balance between demand and 
supply but the eligibility of certain types of credits or projects that are 
subject to regulatory change. It is observed that there is already 
fragmentation in the carbon market with different trading units attracting 
different prices (see chapter 2).  
The second reason for qualitative restrictions is concerned with 
whether chemical companies have inflated production because of carbon 
market revenues. If this were the case, the CDM would create perverse 
incentives for carbon leakage. This question should be addressed on a case-
by-case basis. In practice, the CDM Executive Board investigated whether 
this had occurred for HFCs and found it had not.  
                                                      
40 Such a proposal would have to be approved by member state representatives in 
the EU’s Climate Change Committee and scrutinised by the European Parliament 
and Council. 
41 This deadline has been extended, however, until 30 April 2013, for destruction of 
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Considering the continued recognition of CERs, one way to restrict 
the inflow of CERs arising from certain kinds of projects, such as F-gases, is 
to introduce a multiplier or a change to the UNFCCC’s methodology.  
There are some open regulatory issues concerning the EU ETS Phase 
III. The eligibility criteria of CERs will affect the available supply of offsets. 
The private sector is concerned with regulatory uncertainty or arbitrariness, 
such as the retroactive implementation of new rules. Regulatory 
uncertainty about CDM rules would undermine confidence among market 
operators and prevent them from investing in any new mechanisms.  
The regulations on banning CERs and ERUs from projects on 
industrial gases take this concern into account. Any implementation of new 
r u l e s  o n  C D M  o r  J I  p r o j e c t s  s h o u l d  n o t  b e  r e t r o a c t i v e ,  a s  t h i s  w o u l d  
challenge the credibility and the future of the carbon market. There is a 
need to preserve business continuity in order to give confidence to the 
participants in the private sector that have already invested in CDM or JI 
activities and have contributed to the success of the carbon market.  
While additionality has rarely been contested for projects on 
industrial gases, it could remain an issue for JI Track 1 projects. A 
regulatory framework for JI Track 1 aimed at ensuring environmental 
integrity remains less certain than that for JI Track 2 or the CDM. It is 
possible that in Track 1 certain host countries do not have a robust 
measurement or verification system to ensure the quality of the ERUs to be 
issued, even though there seems to be some improvement in their capacity 
for measurement, reporting and verification. 
4.2  Bilateral sectoral agreements 
If no international agreements were concluded by the end of 2009, Art. 
11(a)(5) of the ETS Directive enables operators to use credits from projects 
or other activities specified in bilateral agreements with third parties in 
order to comply with their obligations under the scheme. This provision, 
however, gives no clarity about the terms of reference for bilateral 
agreements. Among the political challenges are how the EU can best 
reconcile the need for flexibility, for example through bilateral agreements, 
with its commitment to a global comprehensive agreement, along with how 
the EU can enter regional/domestic offsetting schemes without being 
blamed for undermining the CDM. Responding to these challenges 26 | EU INITIATIVES: MOVING BEYOND THE CDM AND EXPANDING THE ETS SECTOR 
 
requires consideration of whether a package of COP/CMP42 decisions or 
domestic legislation can drive the development of a global carbon market. 
While Parties could explore elaboration of new market-based mechanisms 
(including a sectoral mechanism) at UN negotiations, the EU could test the 
concept through demonstration or pilot projects in non-EU countries under 
bilateral agreements.  
4.3  Domestic offsets 
Art. 24(a) of the ETS Directive provides a way for EU member states to 
develop projects that can reduce GHG emissions in non-ETS sectors. JI 
projects in the JI pipeline hosted by EU member states show the potential 
for further emissions reductions. Yet to date little effort has been made to 
clarify detailed procedures to govern domestic offsets.  
Just as the current JI operates under the constraints set for Parties 
under the Kyoto Protocol by the initial allocation of AAUs in CP1, domestic 
offset projects will operate under the constraints imposed on EU member 
states by the initial allocation of annual emissions (annual emissions 
allocations, AEAs) in 2013–20. To avoid double-counting between EUAs 
under the ETS and AEAs under the effort-sharing decision, boundary 
setting and the measurement of emissions from sub-sectors will become 
crucial, with special reference to the implementation of measures aimed at 
energy efficiency, fuel switching or heating in the electricity sector. 
4.4  Aviation in the ETS 
As of 2012, aviation activities are covered by the EU ETS (European 
Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2009c). ETS legislation 
covers all flights to and from EU airports. Exceptions include de minimis 
and third countries with equivalent measures. Emissions caps start with a 
3% reduction in GHG emissions in 2012 below the average of the annual 
emissions from 2004, 2005 and 2006, followed by a 5% reduction in 2013–20. 
While the majority of allowances (85% in 2012 and 82% in 2013–20) will be 
allocated free of charge, 15% of allowances will be auctioned. The revenues 
from auctioning are earmarked for policy objectives, including sustainable 
transport. In 2013–20, 3% of allowances will be reserved for new or fast-
growing operators.  
                                                      
42 CMP refers to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties 
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5.  CARBON PRICING IN THE EU ETS 
t is important to ensure the integrity and consistency of EU legislation 
that supports the EU’s climate change objectives. A carbon market and 
an energy market have different characteristics: in the former, the long-
term supply of allowances is capped, which is not the case for the latter. 
Nevertheless, the two markets need to be made more coherent and be 
linked with one another. The EU ETS has a strong role in promoting 
renewable energy and energy efficiency measures. There are overlaps and 
there could be competing outcomes among the rules in EU legislation, e.g. 
the proposed energy efficiency Directive (European Commission, 2011b) 
and the EU ETS Directive. 
The EU ETS can potentially drive investments towards a low-carbon 
economy by enhancing the long-term price signal. At present, the short-
term volatility of the carbon price and the lack of a long-term price signal 
have limited the scale of investments.  
Recognising the specific nature of carbon markets, this chapter 
discusses carbon pricing of the EU ETS and associated predictability. 
5.1  Increasing predictability 
In principle, the carbon price is determined by the balance between 
demand and supply in the market. EU ETS legislation has brought 
predictability to the carbon market. ETS market participants are aware that 
carbon has a long-term value. Price stability in the short term itself is not a 
major issue: there was excess volatility in the EUA price in Phase I, 
generating uncertainty, but the price movement was rather moderate in 
Phase II. The projected price on the long-term horizon is even more 
important than the current price, especially for influencing transformative 
investment decisions. The development of the EU ETS has started to have 
an impact on investment in the power and industry sectors by setting 
mandatory EU-wide caps in Phase III, which allows the linear decline in 
annual caps to be extended, currently at 1.74% compared with the average 
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annual cap in 2008–12, beyond 2020. Ad hoc and short-term fixes need to be 
avoided in domestic or regional cap-and-trade schemes.  
One way to stimulate investment in mitigation activities would be to 
set a clear long-term trajectory and embed it into EU legislation, e.g. by 
defining targets for 2030, 2040 and 2050. This could be undertaken in 
parallel with short-term adjustments.  
Under the ETS Directive, price visibility in the current five-year 
period or even longer could be enhanced. The ETS emission caps need to be 
aligned with the long-term target for GHG emissions endorsed by the EU.  
In this context, the second option would be to adjust the EU-wide cap 
of the EU ETS from 2020. Art. 9 of the ETS Directive envisages that the 
Commission will review the linear factor (1.74% compared with the 
average annual cap in 2008–12) and submit a proposal from 2020. 
A third option to stimulate investment would be to reduce the overall 
amount of available allowances in the ETS under the EU-wide cap in Phase 
III, i.e. setting aside a certain quantity of the volume to be auctioned, a ‘set-
aside’. It has been claimed that reducing the amount of allowances through 
a set-aside could result in a shortage of supply against the existing cap, 
raise the EUA price and boost auctioning revenues. This claim has been 
questioned, however, on the grounds that the set-aside would generate 
scarcity and support the carbon price only if market participants believed 
that the decision will result in a permanent removal of allowances. It is not 
clear at this juncture if a revision of the EU ETS Directive is required to 
permanently remove these allowances from the market or if, by contrast, 
they could be restored at any time if the price goes up again or towards the 
end of Phase III, thereby putting prices back into a downward spiral. Even 
if market participants buy into this measure, the resulting higher prices 
could have negative impacts on compliance buyers, thereby increasing the 
pressure on measures reverting the effect of the set-aside. It should be also 
recalled that auctioning was originally intended to put a price on carbon 
and place it in the market, not to raise revenues for member states. 
Moreover, such extraordinary measures, if introduced on an ad hoc basis as 
a short-term fix, could reduce the predictability of the scheme, and 
undermine support for and trust in it.  
Alongside carbon prices set by the current EU ETS and renewable 
obligations (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 
2009d), an additional incentive would be needed to induce the electricity 
sector to carry out a significant scale of decarbonisation. A long-term FUTURE CARBON MARKETS | 29 
 
incentive is the key. A domestic policy can provide extra regulatory 
certainty. For example, the UK proposal for a ‘price floor’43 will act as a tax, 
providing price support on top of the EU ETS and revenue to the 
government. It can offer greater predictability to investors. This proposal, 
however, has raised two specific concerns. One is a reservation about any 
form of intervention in markets, along with the principle of avoiding the 
existence of several different policies in the same area. Another is a defence 
against the possible impact of one member state’s measures upon other 
member states under the EU-wide cap and the resulting risk of carbon 
leakage across member states. A recent study estimates that the UK price 
support will lead to the additional abatement of emissions in Phase III by 
the UK electricity sector, but under the current emissions caps for the EU 
ETS, this will reduce demand for EUAs, lower the EUA price and diminish 
EUA auction revenues for other member states (Sartor & Berghmans, 2011). 
While it is becoming clearer that an intergovernmental framework does not 
provide everything needed, the proposed UK price support could become a 
test case and a significant alternative. It is difficult to reach a consensus on 
EU-wide price support: a price floor for one member state could be a price 
ceiling for others.  
                                                      
43   See “Carbon price floor” on the HM Treasury website (http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/consult_carbon_price_support.htm). 30 | 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
xperiences in the EU ETS Phases I and II confirm that the cap-and-
trade scheme is a cost-effective way to achieve the environmental 
objective, i.e. caps on GHG emissions in the ETS sector. In a 
transition to Phase III, EU policy-makers and stakeholders have discovered 
two possible achievements that may be expected from a carbon market. 
One is the creation of additional revenue streams to support climate 
actions, thereby scaling up both mitigation and climate finance. The other is 
the acceleration of technology deployment and the reward of innovation, 
leading to the phasing-in of low-carbon technologies faster than before. The 
first possible achievement, i.e. financing, has been tested and observed in 
CDM and JI projects. There are growing expectations that the EU ETS will 
lead to these achievements as well as fulfil its original purpose. This report 
acknowledges diversity in stakeholders’ opinions about the emphasis on 
each element. 
Insofar as multiple carbon markets exist side-by-side while loosely 
linked to one another, a global carbon market could be built up by indirect 
linking through commodities. For example, the EUA price is set for the EU 
ETS. Beyond the EU border, however, there remains the co-existence of 
several carbon markets setting several different prices. While the EUA 
remains valid until 2020 and beyond, the value of other trading units, such 
as CERs, ERUs and AAUs, depends essentially on the state of international 
negotiations.  
The price of carbon is determined by the balance between demand 
and supply in the market. The EU and countries of the European Economic 
Area have decided to take on binding emission-reduction commitments 
during CP2 of the Kyoto Protocol, whereas a new global agreement that 
could engage all countries, including major emitting economies, will likely 
enter into force in 2020 at the earliest. Nevertheless, the EU’s own demand 
for international credits and the ETS sector’s demand for EUAs will be very 
limited leading up to 2020 unless the EU raises the level of ambition from 
the current 20% cut. In light of the current extent of oversupply, market 
analysts project that the supply of allowances in the ETS will likely exceed 
demand until 2020. 
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Uncertainty casts a shadow not only over the extent of future demand 
but also the capacity of existing and new mechanisms to deliver offsets or 
credits of high quality that meet the MRV requirements. What has emerged 
since Copenhagen is a set of platforms to build scaled-up mechanisms, such 
as sectoral crediting, upon experiences with the CDM and JI and to identify 
preconditions for these mechanisms to work on the ground. It is important 
to note that a common template for mechanism design will not likely apply 
to all sectors, in other words different designs will suit different sectors. 
The preconditions for making new mechanisms operational can be 
identified through the implementation of capacity-building programmes or 
pilot projects in potential host countries. These efforts take time and require 
the active engagement of the private sector – which has data, MRV skills, 
technology and know-how – in the early stage of designing mechanisms. 
Platforms can be bilateral or multilateral, but future flexible mechanisms need 
to be set up in a way that would not increase the fragmentation of carbon 
markets through a proliferation of bilateral or sectoral agreements.  
The EU should ensure sufficient fungibility of different mechanisms. 
Fungibility in this context means that different credits issued in different 
schemes are (partially) compatible to secure sufficient liquidity. It would be 
important to ensure fungibility between the existing and new mechanisms, 
especially if the emerging mechanism options are designed in a bottom-up 
manner. A lack of coordination among the design elements of the 
respective mechanisms leads to a lack of fungibility between credits or 
allowances. The challenge would be to ensure fungibility as well as 
environmental integrity, for example through enhancing measurement and 
verification or using conservative defaults.  
Still, if the EU continues to drive carbon markets until 2020, the 
readiness of future flexible mechanisms will likely have less impact on the 
E U A  p r i c e  t h a n  s c a r c i t y  o r  l i q u i d i t y  i n  t h e  E U  E T S .  T h e  E U  s h o u l d  
endeavour to maintain and improve the cost-effectiveness of the EU ETS in 
mitigation actions. To date, concerns about the short-term volatility of the 
carbon price and the lack of a long-term price signal have hindered 
investments in low-carbon technologies. Additional decisions on the EU 
ETS contemplated by the European Commission or member states should 
not be ad hoc or piecemeal, as that would undermine predictability. The 
European Commission and member states should consider launching a 
process for consultation with stakeholders to minimise ad hoc approaches 
in favour of approaches that have been envisaged in the ETS Directive.   32 | 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND TECHNICAL 
TERMS 
AAU  Assigned amount unit (under Kyoto Protocol emissions trading) 
AEA  Annual emission allocation 
CDM  Clean Development Mechanism (under Art. 12 of the Kyoto Protocol) 
CER  Certified emissions reduction (under the CDM) 
CMP  Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol 
COP  Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC  
CO2 Carbon  dioxide 
CP1 & 2  First and second commitment periods (under the Kyoto Protocol) 
CSI  Cement Sustainability Initiative (under the auspices of the World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development) 
ERU   Emissions reduction unit (under the JI) 
ETS Emissions  Trading  System/Scheme 
EUA   EU emissions allowance 
GDP  Gross domestic product 
GHG  Greenhouse gas (the six gases covered by the Kyoto Protocol, CO2, 
CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs and SF6)  
Gt  Gigatonne (billion metric tonnes) 
HFCs Hydrofluorcarbons 
IEA  International Energy Agency 
IETA  International Emissions Trading Association 
JI   Joint implementation (under Art. 6 of the Kyoto Protocol) 
LDCs Least  developed  countries 
MRV  Measurement, reporting and verification 
Mt  Megatonne (million metric tonnes) 
NAMA  Nationally appropriate mitigation action 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
PFCs   Perfluorocarbons  
REDD   Reducing Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing 
Countries (UN programme) 
UNFCCC United  Nations  Framework  Convention on Climate Change 
WBCSD  World Business Council for Sustainable Development | 33 
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